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YESTERDAY AND TODAY:
OF INDIANS, BREACH OF TRUST, MONEY,
AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Gregory C. Sisk*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twice in the past quarter century, the Supreme Court has composed a duet of
Indian breach of trust decisions that, through dynamic counterpoint, complement each
other to produce a reasonably harmonious arrangement. Each of these two judicial
movements sets one decision that finds an actionable fiduciary relationship against
another decision that rejects trust liability. This pairing of competing strains allows us to
sound out the contrast between those claims against the federal government for default in
trust responsibility that are redressable in damages and those claims that fail to state a
cognizable cause of action and are barred by sovereign immunity. By listening for the
variation between successful and unsuccessful passages, as well as appreciating the
antiphony of the dissenting opinion in each suite, we can hear the thematic tones which
together sound the chords that form an authoritative melody.
To fully appreciate the themes that recur throughout the entire overture, the
Supreme Court's 2003 performance in United States v. Navajo NationI and United States
v. White Mountain Apache Tribe2 must be heard together with the earlier 1980 and 1983
prelude of United States v. Mitchell ("Mitchell P')3 and United States v. Mitchell
("Mitchell 1r,). 4 Although the two sets of decisions are presented two decades apart, the
Court is reading from much the same score in each recital. At the same time, the more
recent pieces add further richness to the music, from which dispositive refrains begin to
emerge. In other words, rather than marking a doctrinal revolution, this year's decisions
are most important by way of confirmation and may comfortably be placed within the
continuum established twenty years earlier. Still, the double act of 2003 is not merely a
reprise of the past work but adds new bars to the concerto, thereby helping the litigative
* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis) (gcsisk@stthomas.edu). The
author writes and speaks widely on the subject of civil litigation against the federal government, including
having published the only law school casebook in the field, Litigation with the Federal Government: Cases and
Materials (Found. Press 2000).
1. 537 U.S. 488 (2003).
2. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).
3. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
4. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
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player to better read the notes for future programs and to choose the right instruments so
as to bring his or her playing under the commanding direction of the judicial conductor.
The Supreme Court's composition efforts began nearly a quarter-of-a-century ago
on a most discordant, even sour, note with its rejection of an Indian breach of trust claim
in Mitchell I, an opinion that failed to recognize the power of the pertinent statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity and that consequently applied a narrow and constrained
reading to the legislation establishing a trust relationship. Fortunately, only three years
later, Mitchell II introduced a more uplifting strain of governmental responsibility for
management of Indian resources, a coda that better resonated with historical experience
and the continuing reality of governmental interaction with the Indian peoples. While
the most recent stanzas in Navajo Nation and White Mountain Apache will not appeal to
all listeners, I suggest that the songs emanating from the Court on this occasion ought
more to evoke hope than sadness for those advocating a more responsive approach to
Indian trust problems. In any event, the Court's most recent rendition provides greater
lucidity to the music.
Turning then from musical metaphor to plain-or at least ordinary legal-
language, the four decisions discussed in this article have much to teach us about the
amenability of the United States to suit for money relief and the cognizability of breach
of trust claims by Native Americans. The lessons to be drawn from these decisions of
yesterday and today may be collected into two categories; the first implicates generally
the sovereign immunity of the federal government from liability for money damages, and
the second applies only to the relatively unique trust relationship between the United
States and Native Americans.
First, because the United States has waived sovereign immunity through the
Tucker Act5 and the Indian Tucker Act6 for monetary claims, the search for a substantive
cause of action for damages in another statute does not proceed under the strict rules of
construction that otherwise apply to commencement of litigation against the federal
government. Moreover, because of the peculiar relationship that has existed between the
federal government and Native American populations, a finding of a fiduciary duty by
the government toward Indians will be supplemented by the general trust doctrine to
infer a right to monetary relief.
Second, in determining the circumstances under which the government may be
held liable in money under the Indian trust doctrine, certain factors figure centrally in the
analysis. These factors include the existence of actual trust language in the pertinent
statute, the exercise by the government of plenary control over Native American assets
pursuant to either detailed statutory rules for management or by actions in occupying
Indian properties, and the countervailing purpose of Congress under certain statutes to
promote Indian self-determination by restoring primary authority over resources to the
tribes.
As a general theme, in the context of Indian breach of trust claims, we appear to
have reached or at least neared the point where the line of sovereign immunity and the
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
6. Id. § 1505.
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line of a cognizable cause of action have merged. When the federal government has
defaulted on a genuine trust obligation, amenability to suit for the monetary
consequences of that failure follows as a matter of course.
II. THE TUCKER ACT, THE INDIAN TUCKER ACT, THE COURT
OF FEDERAL CLAIMS, AND THE INDIAN TRUST DOCTRINE
The United States Court of Claims, which was the predecessor to the modem
United States Court of Federal Claims, was created by Congress in 1855 and given
authority to hear claims against the United States founded upon federal statutes,
regulations, and contracts. 7 In 1886, Congress enacted the Tucker Act, which today
remains the "foundation stone" both for the disposition of non-tort money claims against
the United States and for the adjudicative authority of the Court of Federal Claims. 8
The Tucker Act is a jurisdictional statute that also waives the federal government's
sovereign immunity for monetary claims "founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort. ' '9 By its terms, the Tucker Act excludes cases "sounding in
tort";' 0 instead, the Federal Tort Claims Act,11 subsequently enacted in 1946, waived
sovereign immunity for suits in United States District Court seeking money damages for
tortious wrongs by the federal government. 
12
Trial court jurisdiction over "Big" Tucker Act claims against the United States is
assigned by § 1491(a)(1) of Title 28 of the United States Code to the United States Court
of Federal Claims. 13 The United States District Court retains concurrent jurisdiction
over Tucker Act claims for $10,000 or less under § 1346 of Title 28, which is commonly
known as the "Little" Tucker Act. 14 The Big Tucker Act and the Little Tucker Act differ
only in terms of the designated forum; the substance of the statutory waiver of sovereign
immunity is the same whether a Tucker Act claim is heard in District Court or in the
Court of Federal Claims.
Beyond establishing jurisdiction and waiving sovereign immunity, the Tucker Act
does not create substantive law or define the substance of a claim in and of itself. By its
terms, the Tucker Act permits claims founded upon the Constitution, a federal statute or
regulation, or contract. However, not every violation of or non-fulfillment of a
constitutional or statutory mandate gives rise to a Tucker Act claim. In its classic and
oft-cited 1967 opinion in Eastport Steamship Corp. v. United States,'5 the Court of
Claims held that the Tucker Act claimant must demonstrate that the source of substantive
7. Act ofFeb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
8. C. Stanley Dees, The Future of the Contract Disputes Act: Is it Time to Roll Back Sovereign Immunity?,
28 Pub. Contract L.J. 545, 546 (1999).
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1).
10. Id.
11. Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946).
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680.
13. Id. § 1491(a)(1).
14. Id. § 1346(a)(2).
15. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. CI. 1967).
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law relied upon "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damage sustained." 16 In 1976, in United States v. Testan,17 the
Supreme Court adopted this same formulation, giving full credit to the Court of Claims
for the concept. 18 In sum, a claim is cognizable under the Tucker Act if it is founded
upon a "money-mandating" statute or constitutional provision; that is, one that
contemplates compensation in money for violation of the government's duty.
However, the availability of the Tucker Act to Native American tribal claimants
was doubtful in the past, and the manner of its application in the unique context of the
trust relationship demanded special congressional attention. When the Court of Claims
was originally created 150 years ago, claims by Indian tribes were excluded from the
purview of the court. 19 Accordingly, Indian tribes could seek redress in money damages
in court only if Congress enacted special jurisdictional statutes, leaving the various tribes
to regularly petition Congress for such extraordinary enactments. To avoid the "vast and
growing burden"20 of responding to such requests, Congress enacted the Indian Tucker
Act in 1946. 2 1 In the words of the House sponsor of the legislation, it would "never
again be necessary to pass special Indian jurisdictional acts in order to permit the Indians
to secure a court adjudication on any misappropriations of Indian funds or of any other
Indian property by Federal officials that might occur in the future."
22
The Indian Tucker Act directs, the invocation of jurisdiction by the Court of
Federal Claims
in favor of any tribe, band, or other identifiable group of American Indians residing within
the territorial limits of the United States or Alaska whenever such claim is one arising
under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Executive orders of the
President, or is one which otherwise would be cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if
the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or group.23
Tribal claimants through the Indian Tucker Act thus have access to the Court of
Federal Claims in the same manner and under the same general terms as individual
claimants have through what might be called the "regular" Tucker Act. Thus, the Tucker
Act and its statutory cousin, the Indian Tucker Act, are congruous, differing only in the
identity of the eligible claimant.
Moreover, the presence of a Native American claimant potentially implicates an
area of substantive law beyond that available to the ordinary claimant. As noted earlier,
a claimant seeking a monetary remedy against the United States must identify a source of
16. Id. at 1009.
17. 424 U.S. 392 (1976).
18. Id. at 400.
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 9, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863) (excepting claims "dependent on any treaty
stipulation entered into with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes"). As Nell Jessup Newton has noted, the
plain language of the 1863 statute suggests that it excluded only treaty-based claims and did not deny access by
tribes to the Court of Claims for other types of claims. Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the
Conqueror, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 753, 770 (1992). Nonetheless, for the next eight decades, "all assumed that the
clause excepted any claim brought by an Indian tribe against the Government." Id.
20. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 214 (quoting H.R. Rpt. 79-1466 (1945)) (internal quotations omitted).
21. See28U.S.C.§ 1505.
22. 92 Cong. Rec. 5313 (1946) (statement of Rep. Jackson).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1505.
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substantive law outside of the Tucker Act itself. The same is true of the Indian Tucker
Act. While individual Native American and tribal claimants may pursue constitutional
and statutory claims in the same manner as ordinary claimants for money against the
federal government, the historical guardian-ward relationship between the federal
government and indigenous peoples may also give rise to a special cause of action,
which, as we shall see, is presumptively redressable in money damages.
One prominent commentator, Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr., summarizes
Indian law in this manner:
Practitioners and students of United States Federal Indian Law are all intimately
familiar with the three core, fundamental principles in the field from which all Supreme
Court Indian law jurisprudence extends: the Congressional Plenary Power doctrine, which
holds that Congress exercises a plenary authority in Indian affairs; the Diminished Tribal
Sovereignty doctrine, which holds that Indian tribes still retain those aspects of their
inherent sovereignty not expressly divested by treaty or statute, or implicitly divested by
virtue of their status; and the Trust doctrine, which holds that in exercising its broad
discretionary authority in Indian affairs, Congress and the Executive are charged with the
responsibilities of a guardian acting on behalf of its dependent Indian wards.
24
The third of these core doctrines of Indian law-the trust doctrine-may give
substance to a Tucker Act claim. 25  Indeed, it is in this category-the trust
responsibilities of the federal government as steward or guardian of Indian assets-that
civil claims by Indians and tribes against the United States are most likely to arise.
26
The remainder of this article, and the four Supreme Court decisions that are analyzed
herein, addresses the fundamental question as to what circumstances, in terms of the
underlying statutory schemes, the exercise of federal governmental power, and the
animating congressional purpose, establish the elements of a cognizable Tucker
Act/Indian Tucker Act claim for breach of trust by the United States.
III. YESTERDAY: MITCHELL I AND MITCHELL 11
A. Background: Government Mismanagement of Timber Resources Held in Trust for
the Quinault Tribe
Beginning in the 1850s, the United States uprooted Indian tribes from large areas
of the Pacific Northwest and set them aside on reservations, eventually causing a
24. Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus's Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial Discrimination against
Indigenous Peoples' Rights of Self Determination, 8 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 51, 67 (1991); see William C.
Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nutshell 1-2 (2d ed., West 1988); L. Scott Gould, The Consent
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 810-11 & n. 6 (1996). In addition, as
evidenced by the language of the Indian Tucker Act, referring to claims arising under "treaties of the United
States," tribes also may maintain a direct action against the United States alleging violation of governmental
obligations in treaties with the various tribes. 28 U.S.C. § 1505. For a discussion of treaties with Indian tribes,
see generally Canby, supra note 24, at chapter 6.
25. For a general discussion of the. trust relationship, see Canby, supra note 24, at chapter 3.
26. See generally Gregory C. Sisk, Litigation with the Federal Government: Cases and Materials 500-17
(Found. Press 2000). For a general discussion of the evolution of statutory methods for Indian claims,
including the Indian Tucker Act, see Newton, supra note 19, at 769-75.
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particular group of Indians to settle on the Quinault Reservation, a heavily wooded area
along the Washington state coast.
27
As part of a policy to reduce the power of Indian tribes as collective entities, the
federal government in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries began to allot the
reservation land to individual Indians.28 In the case of the Quinault Reservation, each
29individual parcel originally amounted to about eighty acres of timbered land. Under
the General Allotment Act of 1887,30 which codified this arrangement, the individual
Indians became the beneficial owners of the parcel, but the United States government
continued to hold the land in trust for them. 3 1 The government purported to take
responsibility for managing the allotted lands, including leasing them for timber harvest,
and then paying the resulting revenues to the individual allottees.
32
In 1971, hundreds of Indians, as well as the Quinault Tribe, who owned interests in
these allotted lands filed suit in the then-Court of Claims under the Tucker Act and the
Indian Tucker Act, complaining of mismanagement by the government of the timber
resources. 33 They sought damages for the government's failure, inter alia, to obtain a
fair market value or even to secure any payment for the harvested timber, to uphold
proper forestry standards in management of the properties, and to pay adequate interest
on revenues held, as well as the government's exaction of excessive administrative fees
from the Indians for the management of the lands. 34 The Court of Claims held that the
General Allotment Act created a fiduciary duty on the part of the United States, as the
holder in trust of the lands, to manage the timber resources appropriately, making the
government amenable in damages for its default of that trust obligation. 35
B. Mitchell I: No Actionable Claim Based Upon Limited Trust to Protect Landfrom
Alienation or Taxation
In 1980, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marshall, reversed the
judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of the Indians in Mitchell .36 The Court held
that the General Allotment Act, which provided for division of the reservation lands into
individual allotments, did not provide a substantive damage remedy enforceable through
the Tucker Act.37 Although acknowledging that the General Allotment Act indeed did
establish a trust relationship on behalf of the Indians, the Court found the relationship to
be a "limited" one "that [did] not impose any duty upon the Government to manage
timber resources." 38 Under the Court's reading of the statute, the trust responsibilities of
27. Mitchell I1, 463 U.S. at 207-08.
28. Id. at 208-09; see Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 6 (1995) (describing
the allotment policy as "[t]he greatest and most concerted attack on the territorial sovereignty of the tribes").
29. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 209.
30. 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 106-462, § 106(a)(l), 114 Stat. 2007 (2000)).
31. Id. at389.
32. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 209.
33. Id. at 210.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citing Mitchell v. US., 591 F.2d 1300(1979) (en banc)).
36. 445 U.S. 535 (1980).
37. Id. at 541-46.
38. Id. at 542.
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the federal government under the General Allotment Act were merely to prevent
alienation of the land-that is, prevent the transfer of title to the land away from the
Indian beneficiary-and to hold the land "immune from... state taxation."
39
Although rejecting the claim as premised on the General Allotment Act, the
Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Court of Claims for consideration of
whether other statutes might provide a basis for liability. 40 In sum, while finding that the
timber mismanagement claim as it came before the Court in Mitchell I had been
premised upon an unavailing statute, the Court deliberately left the door open to
continued pursuit of the claim under alternative sources of law. The claimants walked
through that door in the next stage of the case which came before the Supreme Court for
further review as Mitchell II, which is discussed later.
4 1
Justice White, joined by two other members of the Court, dissented, arguing that
the General Allotment Act "creates a bona fide trust, imposes fiduciary obligations on
the United States as trustee in the management of allotted timberlands, and provides a
damages remedy against the United States for breach of these obligations.' 42 Although
departing from the Court's conclusions as applied to the particular statute at issue in this
case, Justice White's dissent made several points that proved prescient for future
development of the caselaw. First, the dissent emphasized that the actual "language of
the Act, which is the starting point for all statutory interpretation, explicitly creates a
'trust."- 43 Second, the dissent urged the Court to consider the real-world context, noting
that the timberlands at issue in the case "cannot, as a practical matter, be managed by the
Indian allottees," 44 meaning that the government must have assumed management
responsibilities. Third, having concluded that fiduciary obligations should attach, the
dissent argued that the government should be regarded as having consented to monetary
liability because it "follows naturally from the existence of a trust and of fiduciary
duties.'
4 5
C. Mitchell II: Approving Liability in Damages for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
Arising From Comprehensive Management Statutes
On remand in the Mitchell case from the Supreme Court, the Court of Claims again
held in favor of the claimants, holding that various timber management statutes enacted
after the General Allotment Act of 1887, together with other statutes regulating
governmental handling of Indian funds, imposed a fiduciary duty upon the United States
for management of these allotted lands. 46 By virtue of that fiduciary relationship, the
39. Id. at 544.
40. See id. at 546.
41. See infra pt. III.C.
42. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 550 (White, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
43. Id. at 547.
44. Id. at 549.
45. Id. at 550.
46. US. v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 211 (1983) ("Mitchell I') (citing Mitchell v. U.S., 664 F.2d 265 (1981)
(en banc)).
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court ruled that the statutes were implicitly money-mandating within the meaning of the
Tucker Act.
4 7
On certiorari review for a second time, the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion
that again was written by Justice Marshall, affirmed the Court of Claims' decision and
permitted the Tucker Act suit to proceed.48
Justice Marshall began by examining the history and nature of the then-Court of
Claims, the Tucker Act, and the Indian Tucker Act.49 In particular, the majority opinion
emphasized that the Tucker Act consistently had been understood, at least until recently,
as constituting the government's express consent to suit for the types of claims listed in
the statute. 50 Justice Marshall then corrected the erroneous suggestion in two prior Court
decisions-United States v. Testan and Mitchell ]-that the Tucker Act was merely a
jurisdictional provision and did not waive sovereign immunity. 5 1 The Court explained
that the Tucker Act itself accomplishes the waiver of sovereign immunity, in addition to
directing claims to the appropriate forum through its jurisdictional directives. 52 The
Court thus clarified that the Tucker Act speaks both to subject matter jurisdiction in the
federal courts and to the amenability of the United States to suit.
Accordingly, after Mitchell II, while a party must find a substantive right-that is,
a cause-of-action--outside of the Tucker Act, the party need not point to a separate
waiver of sovereign immunity. 53 Nor is the interpretation of that source of substantive
law subject to the strict construction rule that otherwise controls the threshold
determination of whether the government has consented to suit.54 The Tucker Act is the
necessary waiver. The constitutional provision, statute, regulation, contract, or trust
relationship upon which the claimant relies need only set forth a right to monetary relief.
Having clarified the framework for analysis of the pertinent statutes, the Court
turned to the question.of whether the Indian plaintiffs had identified a statutory right.to
recovery of money.55 First, the Court reviewed its holding in Mitchell I, which had
found the General Allotment Act to be an inadequate foundation. for imposition of
fiduciary obligations upon the federal government. 56 As Justice Marshall explained, the
General Allotment Act established a trust relationship between the government and the
Indians only to the extent of preventing unwise sales of the lands and holding the lands
immune from state taxation.
57
Second, the Court asked whether other sources of statutory law established a fuller,
more complete fiduciary relationship that specifically addressed management of the
47. See id.
48. Id. at 228.
49. Id. at 211-19. For a discussion of this history, see generally supra Part II.
50. MitchellII, 463 U.S. at 215-16.
51. Id. at 216 (saying that, while adhering to the result in Testan, "this isolated language [regarding waiver
of immunity] should be disregarded").
52. Id. at 212, 215-16.
53. Id. at 218.
54. See id. at 218-19.
55. See Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 216-18.
56. Seeid at217-18.
57. Id.
[Vol. 39:313
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss2/4
YESTERDAY AND TODAY
timber lands on behalf of the Indians.5 8  The Court examined various timber
management statutes enacted subsequent to the General Allotment Act, which direct the
government to manage the Indian forest resources, obtain revenue thereby, and pay the
proceeds to the owners of the allotted lands. 59  The Court found that these statutes
imposed strict duties upon the government to manage these lands and specifically
required the government to take into account the maintenance of the productive use of
the land, the highest and best use of the land, and the financial needs of the owner and
his heirs.60  The Court determined that the language of these statutes confirms the
existence of a fiduciary relationship, especially given the pervasive and complete control
exercised by the government over these lands.
6 1
Finally, Justice Marshall, for the majority, concluded that because of this fiduciary
relationship specifically prescribing management of Indian timber resources, these
statutes may fairly be interpreted as mandating the payment of money-thereby
satisfying the standard for a Tucker Act cause of action.62 Moreover, the Court stated,
absent a damages remedy, the fiduciary obligations of the United States would be largely
unenforceable, because prospective relief would be inadequate and fail to deter federal
officials from defaulting in their: trust duties.
63
Justice Powell, joined by two other'members of the Court, dissented, arguing that
Congress had no more authorized a suit for damages under the timber statutes than under
the General Allotment Act. 64 The dissent reasoned that because none of the statutes
"standing alone reflects the necessary legislative authorization of a damages remedy," 65
Congress simply had not consented to a judicial action for money for mismanagement of
timber resources. 66  Disagreeing with the majority, the dissent insisted that,
notwithstanding the Tucker Act, a strict standard of construction should be applied in
interpreting the pertinent statutes.6 7 Finally, the dissent argued that even if a fiduciary
obligation was established, the remedy of money damages did not necessarily follow.
68
Mitchell I and Mitchell 11, and the contrasts between and within them, set the stage
for future Indian trust doctrine disputes. Indeed, given the parallels between the two sets
of decisions discussed in this article, the Mitchell pair proves to be a preview of coming
attractions when we examine the Court's revisit, of the trust doctrine through two more
decisions in the spring of 2003.
58. Id. at 218-19.
59. Id. at219-24.
60. Mitchell ll, 463 U.S. at 219-24.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 224-27.
63. Id. at 227-28.
64. See id. at 228-38 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
65. Mitchell I1, 463 U.S. at 230 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
66. See id. at 230-32.
67. Id. at 232-33.
68. Id. at 234-37.
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IV. TODAY: NAVAJO NATION AND WHITE MOUNTAINAPACHE
A. Navajo Nation: Rejecting Breach of Trust Liability when an Indian Tribe Retains
Substantial Control over Resources
1. Background: Royalty Rate on Coal Leases Between Private Companies and
the Navajo Nation
Before 1938, the federal government maintained control of Indian mineral
resources held in trust on reservation lands, including the power to grant leases for
development of oil, gas, and coal deposits, even over the objection of the tribes. 69 With
the enactment of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,70 the tribes secured the power
to negotiate coal mining leases themselves, relegating the government primarily to a
supervisory or approval role. The extent of the government's responsibility to intervene
and protect the tribes from exploitation by private entities, however, remained a
contested matter in the litigation that ensued.
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 provides in pertinent part:
On and after May 11, 1938, unallotted lands within any Indian reservation or lands
owned by any tribe, group, or band of Indians under Federal jurisdiction... may, with the
approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes, by authority of the
tribal council or other authorized spokesmen for such Indians, for terms not to exceed ten
years and as long thereafter as minerals are produced in paying quantities.
71
In 1964, the Navajo Nation, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior,
entered into a lease with the corporate predecessor of the Peabody Coal Company for
mining of coal on tribal lands.72 The original lease provided for very low royalty
payments to the tribe. 73 Pursuant to the negotiated terms of the lease, the tribe and the
mining company agreed to delegate power to the Secretary of Interior to adjust the
royalty rate to a "'reasonable' level on the twentieth anniversary of the lease." 74 By the
1980s, the royalty payments to the Navajo Nation were yielding only "about 2 percent of
gross proceeds" 7 5 on the coal, which was well below the twelve-and-a-half percent
royalty that Congress had established as the minimum rate for coal mined on federal
lands.76
As the twentieth anniversary date approached, and anticipating that the Secretary
of Interior would exercise the power conferred in the lease to revise the rate upward, the
Navajo Nation instituted department proceedings to request a substantial adjustment. 77
69. See U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 494 (2003).
70. Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (1938).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (2000).
72. Navajo Nation v. US., 46 Fed. CI. 217, 221 (2000).
73. Id
74. Id.
75. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 495 (quoting Navajo Nation v. U.S., 263 F.3d 1325, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001))
(internal quotations omitted).
76. Id. at 496.
77. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 221.
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In 1984, a lower-level official within the Department of Interior decided that the lease
should be adjusted to a twenty percent royalty rate, a decision that Peabody Coal
Company appealed to high level officials within the department. 78 By mid-summer
1985, both parties apparently became aware that the department planned to deny the
Peabody appeal and uphold the royalty rate increase to twenty percent.
79
Then matters took a disturbing turn, although the full truth of what had transpired
was not uncovered until years later. After a secret meeting between Interior Secretary
Donald Hodel and a representative of the Peabody Mining Company, the Secretary
directed that the parties be informed that no decision on the appeal was imminent and
that the tribe and the mining company would be well-advised to reach their own
agreement on the appropriate royalty rate. 80 Although the tribe was not informed that
the Secretary had intervened or that Peabody had engaged in ex parte communications
with the Secretary, the tribe learned that a decision apparently would not be forthcoming
in the near future and that it should return to the bargaining table.8 1
Subsequently, the Navajo Nation and the Peabody Mining Company reached an
agreement, which raised the royalty rate to twelve-and-a-half percent, retroactive to
1984, and included other concessions such as coal company acceptance of tribal taxation
of coal production. 82  In 1987, after the Navajo Tribal Council approved the lease
amendments and a final agreement was signed, Secretary Hodel approved the negotiated
agreement.
83
2. Court of Federal Claims Decision: Rejecting Trust Liability
In 1993, the Navajo Nation filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims under both the
Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act, claiming that the Secretary of Interior breached
the government's trust obligations by approving the 1987 amendments to the lease.
84
Specifically, the tribe contended that the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 "imposes
a fiduciary obligation [on the Secretary of Interior] to maximize the financial returns
from coal leases" 86 and that the twelve-and-a-half percent royalty rate approved in 1987
was manifestly inadequate.
87
In 2000, Judge Baskir of the Court of Federal Claims concluded that, although
Secretary Hodel's ex parte contacts with the mining company and secret intervention to
prevent a department decision in favor of the tribe was a breach of the general duties
owed by a fiduciary to a beneficiary, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act did not impose
specific trust obligations upon the government sufficient to establish a cause of action on
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 497.
81. Id. at498.
82. Id. at 498-500.
83. Id. at 500.
84. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. CI. at 220-2 1.
85. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g.
86. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. CI. at 220.
87. Id. at 220-21.
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behalf of the tribe for damages. 88 The court agreed with the Navajo Nation that the
Secretary by "deal[ing] in secret with a third party to his beneficiary's detriment"8 9 had
transgressed "common law fiduciary responsibilities." 9°  Nor could the Secretary's
conduct be defended as merely allowing the parties to reach their own agreement through
arms-length negotiations. As Judge Baskir noted, "[a] negotiator's weapon is
knowledge." 9 1 Not only did the Navajo Nation "no longer [enjoy] the benefit of the
threat'92 that the department was about to issue a decision favorable to the tribe, but the
tribe also was in the dark about the mining company's awareness that the tribe "no
longer [possessed] this competitive edge in its bargaining." 93
Nonetheless, to warrant a remedy in the Court of Federal Claims, the court ruled
that "a greater showing is required" 94 than an allegation that general common law
principles had not been observed. The complaining tribe "must show that [the statute in
question] imposes specific fiduciary duties on the government, as opposed to general
duties, and that the United States violated a specific fiduciary duty which Congress
intended to compensate with money damages." 95 A fiduciary obligation to manage
resources is not established by reference to a statutory "process that was 'designed to
protect Indians by subjecting their contracts with third persons to the prior examination
and approval of the Secretary of the Interior." '9 6  Rather, the court explained, the
government by statute must have assumed "the task of managing economic assets."
9 7
Applying that understanding of the requisite trust relationship, Judge Baskir ruled
that while the government, through the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, has "assumed the
responsibility to manage minerals such as coal in a fiduciary capacity, ' 9 8 Congress also
intended "to foster Indian self-determination" 99 and thus to subordinate the
government's role to Indian control. 10 0 On balance, the government's role with respect
to Indian coal mining leases is that of "approval only" 10 1 of previously-negotiated and
executed contracts between Indian tribes and private companies; the statute does not
"impose an affirmative duty to interject government-dictated royalty rates."' 10 2
Accordingly, the Court of Federal Claims concluded, the Navajo Nation had not alleged
a breach of a specific trust duty that could be redressed through an award of damages.
10 3
88. Id. at 219.
89. Id. at 226.
90. Id.
91. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. CI. at 227.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94, Id.
95, Id.
96. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. CI. at 228 (quoting Mont. Bank of Circle, N.A. v. US., 7 CI. Ct. 601, 614
(1985)).
97 Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 230.
100. Id. at 229-30.
101. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. C1. at 230.
102. Id. at 233.
103. Id. at 233-34.
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3. Federal Circuit Decision: Approving Trust Liability
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
concluding that "a trust relationship indeed existed and exists with the Navajo Nation,
and monetary damages are an available remedy for breach of this trust." 10 4 In drawing
the line between a limited trust relationship, which creates no legal rights, and a fully
fiduciary responsibility, which may be the basis for legal recovery against the federal
government, Judge Newman writing for the majority explained:
The difference lies in the level of control the United States exercises in its management of
the land and its resources for the benefit of the Indians. When the United States controls
the Indian resources, the duty is that of a fiduciary; when the Indians control their own
resources, the duty of the United States is lessened appropriately.
105
In contrast with the ruling of the Court of Federal Claims, the Federal Circuit
found the balance of responsibilities for the coal resources tipped toward governmental
control. 106
The court of appeals placed little weight on the fact that coal leases were
negotiated and agreed to by the tribe. Instead, the court insisted that, under the Indian
Mineral Leasing Act and implementing regulations, the federal government retained
"pervasive control ... of the manner in which mineral leases are sought, negotiated,
conditioned, and paid, and the pervasive obligation to protect the interests of the Indian
tribes.' 10 7 In the light of prior circuit precedent, the court explained "that a full fiduciary
duty exists even when the government has less than total control of management of the
resources, and that participation by the Indians in resource management does not absolve
the United States of its responsibility to act in the sole and best interests of the
Indians." 10 8 In this case, after noting the ultimate approval power of the United States
and various legal requirements to which all leases must conform (regarding the size of
the lease, the shape of leased land, terms of leases, etc.), the Federal Circuit concluded
that "[t]he statute and regulations leave no significant authority in the hands of the Indian
tribes whose reservation land contains the minerals ... ,,109
Having determined the existence of an actionable trust creating a cognizable cause
of action, the court majority next found that the Secretary of Interior had breached the
fiduciary relationship by surreptitiously preferring the interests of the mining company to
that of the Native American beneficiary. "10 In addition to this violation of common law
fiduciary duties, the Federal Circuit held that the government contravened what the court
regarded as the statutory command "to obtain for the Indians the maximum return for
their minerals." 
111
104. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1327.
105. Id. at 1329.
106. Id. at 1330-32.
107. Id. at 1331.
108. Id. at 1329.
109. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1331.
110. Id. at 1332.
111. Id.
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Judge Schall dissented in part, although he agreed with the court majority that a
valid cause of action for breach of fiduciary duties had been alleged by the tribe.11 2
Judge Schall "part[ed] company with the majority"' 113 because he believed that, after
finding a general fiduciary relationship, the court must then "determine whether, in the
context of that relationship, the government has breached any specific fiduciary
responsibilities."11 4 Based upon the absence of any specific statutory direction that had
been transgressed, the dissent refused to premise liability upon breach of general duties
of care, candor, and loyalty by engaging in and concealing ex parte communications with
the mining company, the failure to decide the initial appeal of the royalty dispute in the
tribe's favor, the failure to supervise the negotiations, or the failure to secure the highest
possible royalty rate. 115 Instead, Judge Schall concluded that the only action that
violated a specific fiduciary responsibility was the government's endorsement of the
renegotiated coal mining lease pursuant to its statutory approval power without
conducting an economic analysis to determine whether the proposed lease was
"financially beneficial for the Indians involved."'
116
4. Supreme Court Decision: Rejecting Trust Liability
In 2003, the Navajo Nation case arrived at the Supreme Court upon the
government's petition for certiorari.' 1 7 Writing for a majority of six Justices, Justice
Ginsburg began by reiterating the "axiomatic [doctrine] that the United States may not be
sued without its consent," 118 the now-established understanding that the Tucker Act-
and the Indian Tucker Act-both confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Federal Claims
and provides the necessary consent to suit, and that the Tucker Act itself is not a source
of substantive rights. 1
9
The Court majority confirmed the continued primacy of Mitchell I and Mitchell I
as "the pathmarking precedents on the question whether a statute or regulation (or
combination thereof) 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government." ' 120  The Court explained the contrast between Mitchell I and
Mitchell ! as that between a "bare trust" for limited purposes and "full responsibility" by
the government for management of Indian resources. 12 1  The Court held that the
statutory "analysis must train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or
regulatory prescriptions."'122  However, once such a full fiduciary duty has been
112. Id. at 1333-41 (Schall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
113. Id. at 1339.
114. Navajo Nation, 263 F.3d at 1339 (Schall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 1339-41 & n. 5.
116. Id at 1340.
117. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488.
118. Id. at 502 (quoting Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 212) (internal quotations omitted).
119. Id. at 502-03.
120. Id. at 503 (quoting Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 218).
121. Id. at 505 (quoting Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224) (internal quotations omitted).
122. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 506.
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identified in the pertinent statute, the Court said that "the availability of... damages [as
a remedy] may be inferred,"'12 3 even if not expressly referenced in the statute.
Turning then to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, Justice Ginsburg did not find the
statutory imposition of "detailed fiduciary responsibilities"' 124 sufficient to support a
claim for monetary relief. Instead, the Court ruled, "[t]he IMLA simply requires
Secretarial approval before coal mining leases negotiated between Tribes and third
parties become effective and [further] authorizes the Secretary generally to promulgate
regulations governing mining operations."' 12 5 In sum, far from being a case where the
government had been "assigned a comprehensive managerial role" 126 over the mineral
resources or given the "responsibility to secure 'the needs and best interests of the
Indian[s]" '"127 that would characterize a full fiduciary responsibility, the statute, by
failing to introduce any managerial role for the government, did not "even establish the
'limited trust relationship""' 128 found inadequate to support a claim for relief in Mitchell
p129
By the Court's reading of the statute, the Indian Mineral Leasing Act included no
"substantive prescriptions"' 130 regarding the Secretary's approval power over leases that
would "circumscrib[e] the Secretary's affirmation of coal mining leases negotiated
between a Tribe and a private lessee," 13 1 especially where the royalty rate in the lease
approved exceeded regulatory minimums and indeed matched the rate the United States
itself received from leases to mine coal on federal lands. 13 2 The text of the statute did
not define the Secretary's limited approval function to include any duty "to ensure a
higher rate of return for the tribe"' 133 or "to conduct an independent 'economic analysis'
of the reasonableness of the royalty to which a Tribe and third party have agreed."
' 134
Moreover, while the Court hints at distaste for Secretary Hodel's conduct, 135 no specific
statutory or regulatory provision imposed any formal procedural constraints on the
Interior Department's evaluation of the matter. 
136
As further support for the majority's conclusion, Justice Ginsburg asserted that
"imposing fiduciary duties on the Government here would be out of line with one of the
statute's principal purposes."' 137  Because "[t]he IMLA aims to enhance tribal self-
determination by giving Tribes, not the Government, the lead role in negotiating mining
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 507 (citations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 507-08 (quoting Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224).
128. Id. at 508 (quoting Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 542).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 510.
131. Id.
132. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 510-11.
133. Id. at 511.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 514 (saying "[hiowever one might appraise the Secretary's intervention in this case," there
nonetheless was no statutory warrant to impose a duty with an accompanying damages remedy for breach).
136. Id. at 511.
137. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 508.
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leases with third parties," 138 the congressional purpose would be defeated by
"[i]mposing upon the Government a fiduciary duty to oversee the management of
allotted lands."'
139
Justice Souter, joined by two other Justices, dissented. 14° The dissent disagreed
that the Secretary's function in approving mining leases was unguided by substantive
standards, arguing instead that the Secretary had "a fiduciary responsibility to make a
more ambitious assessment of the best interest of the Tribe before signing off.
14 1
Although Native Americans have been given greater responsibility for their own interests
under the statute, Justice Souter insisted that the federal government retained meaningful
protective duties and that the approval power was "a significant component of the
Government's general trust responsibility."' 142 With this interpretive understanding of
the pertinent history and statutory developments, the dissent concluded that the
Secretary's power of consent under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act was to be exercised
so as to maximize revenues from Native American resources. 
143
B. White Mountain Apache: Upholding Breach of Trust Liability When the
Government Assumes Control over Native American Assets
1. Background: Government Occupation of Fort Apache Held in Trust for
White Mountain Apache Tribe
In 1870, the United States Army established Fort Apache in the White Mountains
of east-central Arizona. 144 In the 1920s, control of the fort was transferred to the
Department of Interior, and part of the property was used as the Theodore Roosevelt
Indian School. 145  In 1960, Congress declared that Fort Apache, including the
improvements on the site, "be held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain
Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the
land and improvements for administrative or school purposes for as long as they are
needed for that purpose. ' 146 In 1976, the National Park Service designated the Fort as a
National Historic Site. 147 As the Supreme Court subsequently noted, this "recognition
was no augury of fortune, for just over 20 years later the World Monuments Watch
placed the fort on its 1998 List of 100 Most Endangered Monuments."'
14 8
As alleged by the tribe, the Secretary of Interior exercised the statutory prerogative
to use the property, including many of its buildings, 149 but then allowed Fort Apache to
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 514 (Souter, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
141. Id. at 515.
142. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 516 (Souter, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
143. Id. at 516-18.
144. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. U.S., 46 Fed. CI. 20, 22 (1999).
145. Id.
146. Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8, 8 (1960).
147. White Mt. Apache, 46 Fed. CI. at 22.
148. US. v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465,469 (2003).
149. Id.
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fall into disrepair, failing to perform necessary maintenance on the properties. 150 The
tribe "commissioned an engineering assessment of the property [which reported that] as
of 1998 it would cost about $14 million to rehabilitate the property... in accordance
with standards for historic preservation." 
5 1
2. Court of Federal Claims Decision: Rejecting Trust Liability
In 1999, the White Mountain Apache Tribe filed suit in the United States Court of
Federal Claims under the Tucker Act and the Indian Tucker Act seeking $14 million (the
projected cost of repairs to Fort Apache) in damages for breach of trust, as well as
additional compensation for economic loss. 152 The United States moved to dismiss,
denying that it had any trust responsibility for maintenance or restoration of the Fort
Apache property. 153 Judge Firestone of the Court of Federal Claims granted the motion
to dismiss.
154
Relying upon Mitchell I and Mitchell H as "establish[ing] the parameters for [the]
inquiry," 155 the court explained that "[i]n order to demonstrate that a fiduciary
relationship exists, the claimant must either point to specific statutes or regulations that
impose a duty upon the government to manage tribal resources for the benefit of the tribe
or demonstrate that the government has actually undertaken to do so."' 156 Although the
1960 Act stated that Fort Apache would be held in trust for the tribe, the court ruled that
the trust obligation was subject to an exception for the government's own use of the
land. 157 Thus, rather.than "direct[ing] the government to manage the Fort Apache site
for the benefit of the Tribe," 15 8 the court read the statute as "reserv[ing] the Fort Apache
site for the federal[] government's benefit." 159  Moreover, without any statutory
"mandate to generate income from the property"160 for the benefit of the Indians, the
government lacked a fiduciary duty to maintain or restore the property as a tribal
income-generating asset. 1
6 1
Nor did the Court of Federal Claims believe that the federal government's "day-to-
day occupation, use, control, or supervision of Fort Apache"' 162 generated an actionable
fiduciary relationship. 163 The fact of control alone was insufficient; rather, the court
held, a fiduciary duty arises only when the federal government takes "control for the
purpose of protecting the Indians' financial interests." 164 In the case of Fort Apache, the
150. White Mt. Apache, 46 Fed. C1. at 22.
151. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 469.
152. White Mt. Apache, 46 Fed. C1. at 22-23.
153. Id. at 23.
154. Id. at 29.
155. Id. at 23.
156. Id. at 24 (citing Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224-25).
157. See White Mt. Apache, 46 Fed. CI. at 26.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. White Mt. Apache, 46 Fed. CI. at 27.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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court again understood the purpose of the 1960 Act as "allow[ing] the government to
manage and operate the land and buildings for its own benefit for as long as it needs
them." 16 5 In sum, any failure of the government to maintain the property redounded to
its own detriment, at least from a legal standpoint, because the government had no duty
to manage the property for the benefit of others.
Finally, the court rejected the tribe's argument that, by using property held in trust,
the government assumed the common-law duty of a trustee to preserve the property, such
that the government's failure to maintain it constituted "permissive waste" in breach of
the trust. 166 Even assuming a cause of action for permissive waste could be stated, the
court asserted that the traditional remedy generally is an injunction, not money damages,
which is a remedy beyond the jurisdictional authority of the Court of Federal Claims to
grant. 167
3. Federal Circuit Decision: Approving Trust Liability
In 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed,
recognizing a fiduciary obligation on the part of the federal government to maintain or
restore the buildings which it had occupied under the 1960 Act. 168 Writing for the
majority, Judge Dyk emphasized that the 1960 Act, by its very terms, creates a "trust"
and that the elements of a common-law trust were present, "namely, a trustee, a
beneficiary, and a trust corpus." 169 Although the "mere fact, 170 of a trust relationship
admittedly is not sufficient, 17 1 the court further concluded that an actionable fiduciary
obligation had been statutorily created as well. 
172
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the government's argument, which had been
accepted by the Court of Federal Claims, that a fiduciary duty arises only when the
pertinent statute directs the federal government to manage the assets for the benefit of the
Indians, an express direction that is not to be found in the 1960 Act.173 Instead, the court
of appeals held, "control alone is sufficient to create a fiduciary relationship." 174 The
1960 Act authorizes the government to use the Fort Apache trust property, and "to the
extent that the government has actively used any part of the Tribe's trust property, and
has done so in a manner where its control over the buildings it occupies is essentially
exclusive," 17 5 the court held that the government thereby had assumed a fiduciary duty
to protect the parcels of property so controlled in the manner of a common-law
trustee. 
176
165. Id. at 28.
166. Id. at 28-29.
167. White Mt. Apache, 46 Fed. CI. at 28-29.
168. White Mt. Apache Tribe v. US., 249 F.3d 1364, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
169. Id. at 1373.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1375-77.
173. White Mt. Apache, 249 F.3d at 1375.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1377.
176. Id. at 1376-77.
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Although the 1960 Act may not explicitly define the government's trust duties,
once an enforceable fiduciary duty is found, the court then looks to the common law of
trusts "for assistance in defining the nature of that obligation."' 177 "Under the common
law of trusts,"'178 the court wrote, "it is indisputable that a trustee has an affirmative duty
to act reasonably to preserve the trust property."' 179 The government therefore had a
duty to maintain and make reasonable repairs to the buildings on the Fort Apache site.
180
However, absent some support for an alternative conclusion in the statutory text,
background, or legislative history, the court qualified that the government's duty was to
maintain the property for economic use, not for aesthetic or historical purposes.
18 1
Finally, the court of appeals concluded that, if the tribe were to prove the breach of
the government's duty to maintain and repair the property, an award of money damages
was an appropriate remedy. 182 The court of appeals disagreed with the conclusion of the
Court of Federal Claims that the duty to avoid permissive waste was enforceable only
through an injunction, ruling instead that under traditional trust principles, the
beneficiary of a trust (other than one holding a mere future contingency interest) has an
immediate claim for money damages for any failure by the trustee to preserve the trust
property. 1
83
Chief Judge Mayer of the Federal Circuit dissented, agreeing with the Court of
Federal Claims that the 1960 Act, by reserving to the government the right to use the
property, thereby limited the government's obligation to the tribe. 184 "Nothing in the
1960 Act imposes a fiduciary responsibility to manage the fort for the benefit of the
Tribe," 185 wrote Chief Judge Mayer, "and, in fact, it specifically carves the
government's right to unrestricted use for the specified purposes out of the trust." 1
86
Moreover, the dissent contended that the tribe's interest in the property indeed was
contingent, as the government has the right to use the property in perpetuity, and further
argued that the owner of a contingent future interest may not sue for damages based upon
permissive waste. 
187
4. Supreme Court Decision: Approving Trust Liability
In 2003, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four decision, affirmed the court of
appeals and upheld the finding of an actionable fiduciary relationship in United States v.
White Mountain Apache Tribe. 188 Writing for the majority, Justice Souter began by
emphasizing that, although an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity is a predicate
177. Id. at 1377.
178. WhiteMt. Apache, 249 F.3d at 1378.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1379.
181. Id. at 1380.
182. Id. at 1381-83.
183. White Mt. Apache, 249 F.3d at 1381-83.
184. Id. at 1384 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1384-85.
188. 537 U.S. at 468, 479.
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to any suit against the United States, the Tucker Act and its companion statute, the Indian
Tucker Act, provide such a consent. 18 9 To be sure, neither the Tucker Act nor the Indian
Tucker Act creates a cause of action, requiring that the plaintiff premise the substantive
right upon a statute that "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damage sustained." 190 However, because the Tucker Act
itself provides the necessary sovereign immunity waiver, a strict construction rule does
not apply to this stage of the analysis. 19 1 Thus, the pertinent statute need only "be
reasonably amenable to the reading that it mandates a right of recovery in damages";
192
that is, "a fair inference will do."
19 3
Referring to the Mitchell pair as "the two seminal cases of tribal trust claims for
damages,"' 194 Justice Souter said these two decisions "give a sense of when it is fair to
infer a fiduciary duty qualifying under the Indian Tucker Act and when it is not."195 In
light of the contrasting outcomes in Mitchell I and Mitchell II, the crucial inquiry is
whether the trust is "bare" or "limited," that is, whether the pertinent statute does not
impose upon the government any specific duty to manage Indian resources, or instead
whether a full fiduciary relationship exists by virtue of "comprehensive control '196 and a
"pervasive, 197 role in management of the assets. 198
In light of the Mitchell guidelines, the Court in White Mountain Apache concluded
that the Fort Apache trust statute "goes beyond a bare trust and permits a fair inference
that the Government is subject to duties as a trustee and liable in damages for breach." 19 9
First, the 1960 Act "expressly defines a fiduciary relationship" 2 ° by providing that Fort
Apache be "held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe."
20 1
Second, the United States exercised its discretionary authority to make actual use of the
property, thus "not merely exercis[ing] daily supervision but... enjoy[ing] daily
occupation ' 2° 2 at the Fort Apache site. Accordingly, the Court held, when the
government assumes "plenary" control over assets held in trust, the government likewise
assumes an obligation as trustee to preserve those assets, even absent express statutory
delineation of duties of management and conservation.
203
As the Court observed, "elementary trust law, after all, confirms the commonsense
assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall
into ruin on his watch." 20 4  Further, the Court explained, while the fact of a trust
189. Id. at 472.
190. Id. (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 217) (internal quotations omitted).
191. Seeid. at 472-73.
192. Id. at 473.
193. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 473.
194. Id. at 470.
195. Id. at473.
196. Id. at 474 (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 209) (internal quotations omitted).
197. Id. (quoting Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 219) (internal quotations omitted).
198. White M. Apache, 537 U.S. at 473-74.
199. Id. at 474.
200. Id.
201. 74 Stat. at 8.
202. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 475.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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relationship between the United States and Native Americans alone is not enough to
imply a remedy in damages, and thus "a further source of law [is] needed to provide
focus for the trust relationship[,] ... once that focus [is] provided, general trust law [is to
be] considered in drawing the inference that Congress intended damages to remedy a
breach of obligation."
20 5
Justice Souter, for the majority, also turned away the government's "carve-out"
argument-accepted by the Court of Federal Claims and by the dissent in the Federal
Circuit-which postulated that because the 1960 Act allowed for governmental use, the
government accordingly was excepted from fiduciary responsibilities for the property.
20 6
The Court held that this argument would defeat the "straightforward reading" 2° 7 of the
statute, which expressly established a trust, and one that presumably extended over the
entire site and not only to those parcels left unoccupied by the government.
208
Finally, the Court regarded as "clearly wrong"20 9 the contention that damages
were inappropriate because injunctive relief is the sole remedy suitable for such an
occupation. 21 First, the Court observed, "an affirmative order to repair [the buildings]
is merely... the economic (but perhaps cumbersome) equivalent of damages." 2 11
Second, limiting relief to an injunction would not only leave the tribe uncompensated for
past harm but also would fail to deter the government from engaging in such waste in the
period before a tribe sought legal relief.
2 12
Justice Ginsburg authored a concurring opinion joined by Justice Breyer.2 13
Justice Ginsburg had authored the majority decision in Navajo Nation, which issued on
the same day and reached the opposite conclusion that an enforceable fiduciary
relationship did not exist. 2 14  But she saw no inconsistency between the negative
outcome in Navajo Nation and the positive outcome in White Mountain Apache, given
the different underlying statutory schemes and circumstances. 2 15 Given that the Fort
Apache statute speaks in the language of trust, that the government chose to exercise
daily supervision and enjoy daily occupation of the site, and that the government thereby
exercised "plenary control" of the property, Justice Ginsburg agreed that the government
had assumed a fiduciary duty that was enforceable under the Indian Tucker Act by a
remedy of damages.
2 16
217Justice Thomas, joined by three other members of the Court, dissented. As an
important preliminary matter, the dissent argued that the majority had altered the
applicable canons of interpretation by permitting recovery if "common-law trust
205. Id. at 477.
206. Id. at 476.
207. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 476.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 478.
210. Id. at 478-79.
211. Id. at 478.
212. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 478-79.
213. Id. at 479 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
214. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 493; see supra pt. IV.A.
215. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 480-81 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
216. Id. at481.
217. Id. (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
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,218principles permit a 'fair inference' that money damages are available'" . rather than
examining "whether an Act 'can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the
Federal Government for the damage sustained."' 2 19  Thus, the dissent contended, a
distinct statutory reference to money damages is necessary, and "the existence of a trust
relationship does not itself create a claim for money damages." 220 Moreover, in Justice
Thomas's view, the Court majority gave "far too much weight to the Government's
factual 'control' over the Fort Apache property"2 21 in ruling that the government had
assumed fiduciary obligations. 222 Nor should "'control' alone" be understood, without
congressional consent, to give rise to a duty to preserve the property. 223 In any event,
the dissent read the 1960 Act as specifically carving out the government's right to
unrestricted use of the Fort Apache property, for its own benefit and not that of the
Indians.224  Justice Thomas concluded that "the Court radically alters the relevant
inquiry from one focused on the actual fiduciary duties created by statute or regulation to
one divining fiduciary duties out of the use of the word 'trust' and notions of factual
control. 22 5
V. DRAWING LESSONS FROM YESTERDAY AND TODAY
A. Sovereign Immunity and Substantive Rights under the Tucker Act and the Indian
Tucker Act
1. General Lesson About Sovereign Immunity and the Substantive Right to
Monetary Relief under the Tucker Act
In Mitchell I, the Supreme Court demanded that an individual claimant "look
beyond" the Tucker Act to find a waiver of sovereign immunity. 226 In so doing, the
Court perpetuated an error that had originally appeared in United States v. Testan four
years earlier. In Testan, the Court mistakenly described the Tucker Act as an unadorned
jurisdictional statute that not only failed to create any substantive right to relief (a point
of common understanding) but that also did not constitute consent to suit against the
227sovereign (a misguided interjection). As Mary Christina Wood aptly labels it, the
judicial nullification of this statutory waiver of sovereign immunity was "a bizarre lapse
from standard Tucker Act analysis." 2 28 Fortunately, this slip in reasoning soon was
corrected.
218. Id. at 482 (quoting id. at 473 (majority)).
219. Id. (quoting Testan, 424 U.S. at 400).
220. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 483 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
221. Id. at 484-85.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 486.
224. Id. at 484.
225. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 487 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
226. 445 U.S. at 538.
227. 424 U.S. at 398.
228. Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 1471, 1518 n. 218; see Richard W. Hughes, Can the Trustee Be Sued for Its
[Vol. 39:313
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss2/4
YESTERDAY AND TODA Y
In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court clarified that the Tucker Act itself accomplishes
the waiver of sovereign immunity, in addition to directing claims to the appropriate
forum through its jurisdictional directives.229 Both Navajo Nation and White Mountain
Apache now have confirmed this basic proposition that the Tucker Act is consent to suit
and that a second waiver of sovereign immunity in some other statute is not expected.2 3 °
Thus, while a party still must find a substantive money-mandating source of law for a
claim beyond the Tucker Act, the party need not find a separate waiver of sovereign
immunity elsewhere; nor is the interpretation of that proposed source of substantive law
subject to the strict construction rule that otherwise controls the threshold determination
of whether the government has waived immunity.
To appreciate the significance of this clarification/confirmation on sovereign
immunity, it is helpful to return to the Court's original affirmation of this essential point
in Mitchell II. Comparing the majority and dissent in Mitchell 11, two points of
fundamental disagreement emerge, a detailed examination of which is instructive both
for understanding the Mitchell line of cases and for appreciating the recent reiteration-
and indeed solidification-of this point in White Mountain Apache. In the Mitchell II
debate between the majority and the dissent, the first point of departure concerned
whether the Tucker Act accomplished the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity. The
second, which will be addressed in the next subsection of this article, concerned whether
a monetary remedy may be inferred in the Indian trust context when the pertinent statutes
do not in so many terms refer to money.
23 1
On the question of sovereign immunity, Justice Marshall, for the Mitchell H
majority, recognized the Tucker Act as both a jurisdictional grant and a congressional
consent to suit.23 2 By contrast, Justice Powell, in dissent, adhered to the deviating and
isolated statements in Testan and Mitchell I that viewed the Tucker Act merely as
locating jurisdiction in the Court of Claims without waiving federal sovereign
immunity. 233  For that reason, Justice Powell approached the timber management
statutes at issue in Mitchell II from a very different and more demanding perspective
than Justice Marshall. Whereas the majority of the Court examined these statutes only to
find a substantive right to relief,234 Justice Powell stipulated that these statutes, by
express terms, must produce a right to judicial action for damages.235
In other words, Justice Powell insisted that the timber management statutes be
construed strictly and narrowly to determine whether they actually include an express
waiver of sovereign immunity. Given that, admittedly, none of these statutes make any
direct reference to a right to file a lawsuit, a negative result was foreordained under the
dissent's analysis. By contrast, having found the waiver of sovereign immunity in the
Breach? The Sad Saga ofUnited States v. Mitchell, 26 S.D. L. Rev. 447, 456-60, 490-93 (1981) (criticizing the
Court's refusal in Mitchell I to recognize the Tucker Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity).
229. 463 U.S. at212-16.
230. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 502-03; White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 472-73.
231. See infra pt. V.A.2.
232. 463 U.S. at 216-19.
233. Id. at 230-33 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
234. Id. at 219-27.
235. Id. at 231-32 & n. 6 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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Tucker Act itself, the majority was not obliged to apply a rule of strict and narrow
construction. 236 Because the Tucker Act, by its plain language, legislative history, and a
hundred years of court precedent, grants consent to suit against the United States for
money damages, the Mitchell H dissent's refusal to accept the Tucker Act as a waiver of
sovereign immunity was standing against the weight of text, history, and practice. 237
As noted, both Navajo Nation and White Mountain Apache echo the teaching of
Mitchell 11.238 White Mountain Apache provides the clearest and most affirmative
directive to date, as the Court majority explained that the "'fair interpretation' rule
demands a showing demonstrably lower than the standard for the initial waiver of
sovereign immunity." 239 Moreover, the Court stated:
To the extent that the Government would demand an explicit provision for money
damages to support every claim that might be brought under the Tucker Act, it would
substitute a plain and explicit statement standard for the less demanding requirement of fair
inference that the law was meant to provide a damages remedy for breach of a duty.
2 40
Because every member of the Court, without exception, joined either the majority
in Navajo Nation or the majority in White Mountain Apache, even if he or she dissented
in one or the other, presumably there is now unanimous consent on the elementary
proposition that the Tucker Act, in both its "regular" and Indian varieties, is an express
statutory waiver of sovereign immunity.
Although the dissent in White Mountain Apache complained that the Fort Apache
statute did not provide "evidence of congressional intent to authorize a suit for money
damages, ' 24 1 the context of the discussion indicates that the dissent was criticizing the
majority's inference of money damages as a remedy for the government's assumption of
control but was not demanding that an alternative statute be cited for purposes of consent
to suit.24 2 In other words, the dissent was not insisting upon strict construction of the
pertinent statute so much as focused construction; that is, an examination of the statute
for indicia that it contemplated monetary compensation for governmental defaults rather
than merely outlined governmental responsibilities without suggesting payment of
money for mismanagement. As discussed further below, the dissent's more rigorous
approach is sound in the context of most claims against the federal government seeking
monetary redress, and was rejected by the White Mountain Apache majority only in the
context of the unique trust relationship that has prevailed between the United States and
the Indian peoples. 243 In sum, on the threshold question of whether the Tucker Act
constitutes an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, all judicial players now
appear to be on the same page.
236. Id. at 218-19.
237. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 212-16; see supra nn. 226-28 and accompanying text.
238. See supra n. 230 and accompanying text.
239. 537 U.S. at 472.
240. Id. at 477.
241. Id. at 483 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
242. See id. at 481-84.
243. See infra pt. V.A.2.
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2. Particular Lesson Regarding the Role of the Indian Trust Doctrine in
Inferring a Substantive Right to Monetary Relief under the Indian Tucker Act
While the Supreme Court has clearly established that the Tucker Act itself
accomplishes the requisite waiver of sovereign immunity, the plaintiff still must identify
a right to monetary relief from another source of law. For ordinary litigants, while they
have been relieved of the requirement of making the rigorous showing that another
statute also includes consent to suit (because the Tucker Act serves that purpose), they
still must demonstrate that the substantive right found in that other statute is a right to
money, that is, money-mandating in nature. However, when the grievances of Native
Americans against the government for neglect of trust responsibilities are at issue, the
trust doctrine itself provides the right to a monetary recovery. On this point,
disagreement ahaong the members of the Supreme Court persists, although the majority's
mandate is increasingly clear.
As with the sovereign immunity matter, returning to the foundational precedent
from two decades ago is a worthwhile exercise. A more detailed examination of the
disagreement between the majority and dissent in Mitchell II sharpens our understanding
of both the nature of the issue and the significance of the majority's resolution. In
Mitchell II, the timber management statutes themselves, while imposing detailed
managerial obligations on the government, did not directly suggest that money damages
ought to be paid for the government's failure to properly manage these resources.
Nonetheless, Justice Marshall, for the majority, concluded that the statutes were money-
mandating in nature precisely because they did create a fiduciary relationship. 244 Thus,
the majority's ruling in Mitchell II appeared to state a tautology: if a full fiduciary
relationship was created, then any breach of the government's obligations was
redressable in money damages. In other words, if a genuine trust obligation was found,
then money followed.
In 'so ruling, the Mitchell II Court diverged from the analytical approach ordinarily
applied to statutory claims under the Tucker Act, wherein the pertinent statute is
inspected to see if it directly contemplates compensation in money for violation of the
government's duty.2 4 5 Not every violation or non-fulfillment of a statutory mandate
gives rise to a Tucker Act claim. 246 For example, a military base might be closed in
violation of a statutory procedure or even in contravention of a directive by Congress
that facilities of a certain nature not be closed. But that statutory violation by itself
would not support a Tucker Act claim by businesses in the community surrounding the
base for damages in the form of lost business profits. Similarly, if the Federal
Communications Commission unlawfully denied a radio license, that statutory violation
likely would not permit a Tucker Act claim by the radio station for lost economic
244. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 224-27.
245. For a discussion of the "money-mandating" requirement, see generally Sisk, supra note 26, at 461-62,
468-69.
246. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216 ("Not every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal statute, or a
regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act."); David M. Cohen, Claims for Money in the Claims Court, 40
Cath. U. L. Rev. 533, 535 (1991) ("[T]he nature of the statute upon which the plaintiff relies is significant
because the United States clearly is not required to respond with the payment of money in every case in which
the government violates a statute.").
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opportunities. Either case might give rise to a claim under the Administrative Procedure
Act asking the court for specific relief in the form of an order that the base be reopened
or the radio license be given. But presumably no claim for money damages under the
Tucker Act would be allowed.2 47
By contrast, in the context of a claim of breach of trust by Native Americans,
Justice Marshall, for the Mitchell II majority, adopted a two-step alternative process for
inferring a compensatory remedy: (1) the Court determines whether the statutes create a
full fiduciary relationship, distinctively related to the management of the resources at
issue in the case, and then having so determined, (2) the Court rules that the fiduciary
obligation itself entails payment of damages for default. 24 8 As Justice Marshall wrote,
"the existence of a trust relationship between the United States and an Indian or Indian
tribe includes as a fundamental incident the right of an injured beneficiary to sue the
trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust."
249
Justice Powell's disagreement as to the first step of this analysis, that is, his refusal
to find an enforceable fiduciary relationship in Mitchell II, reflected his strict and narrow
reading of the statutes. As discussed above, Justice Powell's persistent refusal to
recognize the Tucker Act as a waiver of sovereign immunity was a departure from
established Tucker Act doctrine. 25 However, as to the second step, Justice Powell fairly
drew attention to a major doctrinal development which, although consistent with prior
precedent, had never been so boldly articulated and applied before. Because the timber
management statutes interpreted in Mitchell II directed governmental management of a
resource, but did not explicitly suggest that damages ought to be paid for errors or
defaults in that management, Justice Powell described the majority's use of a trust
relationship to create a fiduciary obligation-and thereby declare the statutes as money-
mandating despite the absence of compensatory language-as bootstrapping one stage of
analysis into a fragile conclusion.
25 1
On balance, however, Justice Marshall had the stronger side of the argument for
two reasons. First, the timber management statutes dealt not only with the supervision of
the timber lands but also with payment of revenues obtained to the Indians, thus at least
touching upon matters of money and finances. 252 While this statutory reference likely
would not be enough to support a Tucker Act claim for compensatory damages outside
of the Indian trust context (although a claim to release unpaid revenues being held by the
government surely would be cognizable), the statutes at issue in Mitchell H at least
implicated governmental responsibilities beyond management of the land itself.
Second, and more importantly, Justice Marshall brought the timber management
dispute into the particular context of Indian law, with the integral element of the general
trust relationship being placed at the center of the discussion.253 Focusing exclusively
upon statutory text, Justice Powell regarded the trust element as incidental or inapposite
247. Sisk, supra n. 26, at 461-62.
248. See 463 U.S. at 224-28.
249. Id. at 226.
250. See supra pt. V.A.1.
251. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 234 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
252. Id. at219-20.
253. Id. at 225-26.
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to the question of damages as a remedy.254 In the words of the Mitchell II majority, the
"construction of these statutes and regulations is reinforced by the undisputed existence
of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people."
255
In the case of a Native American claimant, where the government has assumed
pervasive control over Indian assets, the trust doctrine unavoidably overlays and infuses
the legal analysis. At each step of the statutory interpretation process, the trust doctrine
dominates and influences the analysis. The inevitable conclusion then is that a fiduciary
responsibility relating to the most fundamental form of wealth, that is, real property and
its resources, is of monetary consequence. To be sure, absent the special trust
relationship between the federal government and the Indian peoples, it is doubtful that
the type of governmental duties prescribed in the timber management statutes at issue in
Mitchell I!-duties regarding land use and care, supervision and regulation of timber
cutting, etc.-would be viewed as "money-mandating" in nature so as to give rise to a
Tucker Act claim. However, unless the Court were to retreat into an artificial
construction of each individual statutory embodiment of the general trust relationship,
the Court cannot neglect the omnipresent implications of that elaborate bond between the
United States and the Indian peoples.
Although the Court even today is not yet of a single mind on the matter, a clear
majority in each of the 2003 decisions ruled that a monetary remedy indeed is implicit in
the trust relationship. In Navajo Nation, the majority said that in looking for a
substantive right to relief in a statute in an Indian breach of trust case, "the analysis must
train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions.
Those prescriptions need not, however, expressly provide for money damages; the
availability of such damages may be inferred. ' '256 Likewise in White Mountain Apache,
the Court held that once the "focus" of a specific fiduciary duty has been provided,
"general trust law [is to be] considered in drawing the inference that Congress intended
damages to remedy a breach of obligation."
257
The dissent in White Mountain Apache, relying upon precedent that applies to
Tucker Act claims founded upon statutes outside of the Indian trust context, refused to
go along and argued that a monetary remedy should not be inferred where the statute not
only fails to "specifically authorize the award of money damages[,] ... [but] does not
even 'spea[k] in terms of money damages or of a money claim against the United
States."' 258 But the White Mountain Apache majority responded that this demand for an
express statutory reference to money damages "would read the trust relation out of
Indian Tucker Act analysis." 259  As the Court said, if the right-creating statute
specifically provides for monetary compensation for a violation, then the statute standing
alone would mandate recompense, while identification of a trust obligation and
application of trust law would become superfluous.
254. See id. at 233-35 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
255. Id. at 225.
256. 537 U.S. at 506.
257. 537 U.S. at 477.
258. Id. at 482 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Gnotta v. US., 415
F.2d 1271, 1278 (8th Cir. 1969)).
259. Id. at 477.
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3. Persisting Differences between "Regular" and Indian Tucker Act Claims
When Identifying a Substantive Right to a Monetary Remedy
In sum, while Mitchell H1 and White Mountain Apache significantly ease the burden
upon any person or entity who pursues a monetary remedy against the federal
government, the burden is made even lighter for Indian claimants, at least in terms of
recourse to money as a remedy. Accordingly, significant differences remain for court
recognition of what we might call "regular" Tucker Act claims as contrasted with claims
by Native American parties asserting breach of trust. For the ordinary Tucker Act
litigant, the removal of the strict construction rules for waivers of sovereign immunity is
the primary boon granted by the Court's breach of trust decisions. For the Native
American claimant, the additional removal of the requirement that the underlying
statutory right be defined in terms of money becomes a further advantage in litigation.
The permissive inference that breach of the governmental duty necessarily justifies
a monetary remedy simply is not available to the ordinary litigant seeking to hold the
federal government amenable to damages, when there is not "any trust relationship in the
mix of relevant fact."260  If a plaintiff pursues a "regular" Tucker Act claim, the
substantive right adduced from a statute must be one that entails the payment of money;
that is, one that mandates compensation. Thus, while the statute need not authorize
judicial action or even contemplate the prospect of litigation-the Tucker Act expressly
creates the right to file suit-the statute must speak in the dialect of lucre. Without some
reference to money or financial consequences in the statute relied upon for the cause of
action, the statute cannot be fairly interpreted as conveying a right to monetary
compensation within the meaning of the Tucker Act. When the case is-one for breach of
the government's fiduciary responsibilities to indigenous peoples, by contrast, the
monetary nature of the remedy is implicit in the trust doctrine.
B. Factors in Finding and Defining an Enforceable Fiduciary Relationship under the
Indian Tucker Act
Dean Nell Jessup Newton observes that the Supreme Court identified three species
of trust relationships in the Mitchell breach of trust decisions. 26 1 First, as a background
262concept, a "general trust" relationship "is merely the statement of the historic
relationship between Indian tribes and the Government," 26 3 which generates no
enforceable duties although significantly "it provides the rationale for reading statutes
liberally. ' 264 Second, a "limited trust' 265 is one that is "established for a narrow and
limited purpose, ' 266 which presumably is enforceable according to its restricted terms
but creates no broader governmental responsibilities. 267  Third, a "full fiduciary
260. Id.
261. Newton, supra n. 19, at 801.
262. Id.
263. Id
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Newton, supra n. 19, at 801 (footnote omitted).
267. See id. at 801-02.
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relationship" 268 is that which places more general responsibilities upon the federal
government in managing Indian assets.
269
In Mitchell II and White Mountain Apache, the Supreme Court confirmed that a
genuine fiduciary relationship between the United States and an Indian tribe creates a
duty enforceable through the remedy of a Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act action for
damages. 27  While this is a vital declaration as a general proposition-offering the
possibility of victory in litigation in the abstract-the decisive inquiry in any particular
case remains whether the government has assumed a full fiduciary relationship with its
attendant responsibilities. As discussed in the succeeding subsections of this article,
through Navajo Nation and White Mountain Apache, the Court has identified certain
factors that weigh in one direction or another,2 71 factors that have roots in the majority
or dissenting opinions from the Mitchell sequence some twenty years earlier.
1. The Concept of Trust in Statute and Common Law
a. Express Statutory Denomination of Trust
If the statute upon which an Indian breach of trust claim is premised actually
employs the word "trust," one might expect that textual term of art to be dispositive. But
when the Court started down the path in the Mitchell breach of trust cases a quarter of a
century ago, it directly refused to accept the plain language of trust as controlling on the
question of broader fiduciary responsibilities. Yet, after the Court's most recent
dissertation on the question, congressional use of terms of "trust" now may figure more
centrally in the analysis.
In the Mitchell sequence of cases more than twenty years ago, the Court steered
between the opposite shores of ruling that the use of the word "trust" in a statute
compelled a finding of a full fiduciary relationship and of dismissing the existence of a
trust as entirely irrelevant to the question of whether a monetary remedy against the
sovereign was permissible.
In Mitchell I, the statute under review, the General Allotment Act, was explicit in
stating that the United States held the lands allotted "in trust for the sole use and benefit
of the Indian to whom such allotment shall have been made." 272 Justice White, in
dissent, described the statutory language "explicitly creat[ing] a 'trust" '2 73 as "the
starting point for.., statutory interpretation. ' '274 Indeed, given his stress upon giving
the words of the statute their ordinary meaning, it is fair to say that this statutory
denomination of a trust led directly toward an ending point for Justice White's analysis
268. Id. at 802.
269. Id.
270. See supra pts. Il.C, IV.B.4 (discussing Mitchell and White Mountain Apache respectively).
271. The following list is not designed to be all-inclusive, that is, encompassing every factor that possibly
could prove relevant to determining whether an actionable fiduciary relationship has been assumed by the
government. Rather, the factors addressed here are those that are most prominently displayed in the four
Supreme Court breach of trust decisions discussed in this article.
272. 24 Stat. at 389.
273. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 547 (White, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
274. Id.
2003]
29
Sisk: Yesterday and Today: Of Indians, Breach of Trust, Money, and Sove
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2003
TULSA LAW REVIEW
275
as well. However, under Justice Marshall's reading of the statute, the trust
obligations of the federal government prescribed by the General Allotment Act were
merely to prevent alienation of the land (that is, prevent the transfer of title to the land
away from the Indian beneficiary) and to hold the land immune from state taxation. 276
Because the Native American claimants in Mitchell I sought redress, not for loss of the
land itself or because of imposition of state taxes, but for the government's alleged
mismanagement of the timber resources on the land, the Court found the General
Allotment Act to be inapposite authority. In sum, the Court declined to infer a broader
fiduciary relationship based upon the presence of a particular word in a statute.
At the same time, the limited trust acknowledged in Mitchell I presumably was not
entirely devoid of content. Although the Court in Mitchell I found the statutory trust too
narrow in scope to encompass duties of resource management, we may imagine that had
the federal government breached the particular trust obligations mandated by the General
Allotment Act, by allowing the sale of the land or by permitting state taxes to be
withheld from profits earned on the property, the government would have been liable for
damages under the General Allotment Act as applied through the Tucker Act.2 77 Thus,
even under the constrained Mitchell I precedent, the language of "trust" likely had the
legal effect of imposing an enforceable duty upon the government, although the scope
would vary according to the breadth of the governmental role in relation to Indian
property or resources.
In Mitchell II, by contrast, the Court found that a set of statutes and regulations
providing for comprehensive governmental management of timber lands gave rise to an
actionable fiduciary relationship redressable for breach by money damages. 278 Although
the Court did not cite specific "trust" language in the pertinent statutes as supporting the
result, the statutes and regulations established pervasive governmental control and
supervision of the Indian timber resources. 279 And, of course, those timber management
statutes had been enacted as a supplement to the original General Allotment Act, which
plainly did establish a limited form of trust over the allotted lands, as recognized even in
Mitchell L2 80 Significantly, the dissent in Mitchell II contended that "[t]he mere
application by a court of the label 'trust' cannot properly justify disregard of an
immunity from damages the Government has never waived."2 8 1 In the dissent's view,
"even the existence of a trust does not necessarily establish that the Government has
surrendered its immunity from damages. ' 282  By instead holding that a fiduciary
relationship implies the right to recovery in damages for its breach, the Mitchell H
275. See id. at 547-48.
276. Id. at 544 (majority).
277. See Newton, supra n. 19, at 806 ("[If an allottee could establish that the Government stood by and did
nothing while the state taxed the land and subsequently sold it to collect taxes, it would seem that this failure to
act in contravention of the purpose of the limited trust would ground a claim for money damages." (footnote
omitted)).
278. 463 U.S. at219-25.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 224 (referring to the General Allotment Act as interpreted in Mitchell 1).
281. Id. at 238 (Powell, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
282. Id. at 234-35 n. 8.
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majority confirmed at least that statutory creation of a trust has powerful legal
potential.2 83
Coming forward to the present day, the Court's most recent decision in White
Mountain Apache appeared to place greater significance upon the appearance of the
word "trust" in the pertinent statute. Both the majority and the concurrence placed
singular weight upon the "trust" language in the statute. Justice Souter gave priority of
analytical order to the presence of "trust" terms, by beginning the statutory interpretation
phase of the majority opinion with the observation that "[t]he statutory language, of
course, expressly defines a fiduciary relationship in the provision that Fort Apache be
'held by the United States in trust for the White Mountain Apache tribe."' 284 The Court
immediately dismissed any suggestion that such language created a mere "bare trust,"
observing that the statute grants the government power to make direct use of the corpus
of the trust. 285 In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg likewise emphasized that the statute
"expressly and without qualification employs a term of art ('trust') commonly
understood to entail certain fiduciary obligations."
286
In sum, while perhaps not a talisman that magically gives rise to a fiduciary
relationship whenever it appears, the word "trust" has become more than a mere
rhetorical launching point in the interpretive journey. When Congress does bring the
word "trust" (or, presumably, a synonym such as "fiduciary") into play when describing
the relationship of the United States to the Indian peoples, the persuasive burden then
ought to shift to the government to prove that the intended trust is narrowly
circumscribed. When Congress denominates the relationship as one founded upon
"trust," a presumption should follow that the relationship is pregnant with fiduciary
responsibilities. While the absence of the word "trust" in a statute should not detract
from judicial enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities that arise from a comprehensive
statutory scheme, the actual presence of that term of art in the statute places the entire
inquiry on a different plane.
b. Role of General Trust Relationship and Common Law of Trust
Neither the general trust relationship that has historically existed between the
United States and the Indian peoples nor elements of the common law of trust may,
standing alone, impress enforceable fiduciary duties upon the federal government. At
the same time, however, history does frame a context within which statutory
interpretation should proceed in breach of trust cases. And the familiar standards of the
common law of trust may be drawn upon to flesh-out the skeleton of a statute-based
relationship.
287
283. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 225-28.
284. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting 74 Stat. at 8) (footnote omitted).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 480 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., concurring).
287. Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The Department of Justice's Conflict of Interest in Representing
Native American Tribes, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 1307, 1373 (2003) (stating that, once a right to breach of trust relief is
established in statute, "the common law of trust will aid in fleshing out the obligations of the government").
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Twenty years ago, in Mitchell 11, the Court insisted that the "sources of substantive
law '288 upon which breach of trust claims must be based are "various Acts of Congress
and executive department regulations.' '289  Thus, congressional enactments or
administrative regulations must be adduced to "establish a fiduciary relationship and
define the contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities." 290 Today, in Navajo
Nation, the Court has again explained that the search for an actionable fiduciary
relationship "must train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or
regulatory prescriptions. ' '29 1 In sum, a Native American claim for breach of trust against
the federal government must be constructed upon a statutory foundation.
However, while neither the guardian-ward concept that has dominated federal
government relations with the tribes nor general rules of common law that govern
assumption of control over another's property may create a legally-cognizable fiduciary
relationship, that historical concept and those trust principles are important interpretive
aids. First, as the Court directed in Mitchell II, "the undisputed existence of a general
trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people" 292 should be
appreciated as "reinforc[ing]" the process of statutory interpretation. 2 93 In other words,
a court should give a liberal construction to the statutes, generously reading ambiguities
in the context of "the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in
its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people."
294
Second, common law trust principles may be consulted in determining whether the
government's duties created or outlined by a statute have been executed in a manner that
comports with fiduciary standards:
Once [the court has] determined that a fiduciary obligation exists by virtue of the
governing statute or regulations, it is well established that [the court] then look[s] to the
common law of trusts, particularly as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, for
assistance in defining the nature of that obligation.
29 5
To be sure, the statute establishes both the fiduciary relationship and the subject of
that governmental responsibility. Then, in evaluating whether the government's conduct
offended the fiduciary expectations inherent in such a trust relationship, reference to the
common law of trusts is appropriate to identify the standards for measurement.
The Supreme Court's recent White Mountain Apache decision exemplifies this
analytical process. The Court first determined, based upon the explicit trust language of
the statute and the government's decision to occupy the trust property, that an
296enforceable fiduciary relationship existed. The Court then turned directly to
"elementary trust law '297 to give content to the government's duty by drawing upon the
288. 463 U.S. at 219.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 224.
291. 537 U.S. at 506.
292. 463 U.S. at 225.
293. Id.
294. Seminole Nation v. U.S., 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942).
295. White Mt. Apache, 249 F.3d at 1377.
296. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 474-75.
297. Id. at 475.
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common law duty of the trustee to preserve and maintain trust assets from
deterioration.
298
In sum, a common law duty cannot give rise to a legally cognizable right by the
tribes against the government for breach of trust. A statutorily-created fiduciary
relationship remains an indispensable prerequisite. But the common law may be
indispensable in providing further substance to the relationship, especially when
evaluative standards are not provided by the statute that created the substantive right.
And, of course, as discussed above, the propriety of damages as the remedy for breach of
trust is derived from the common law standards. 299.
2. Control of Indian Resources by Government under a Comprehensive
Management Statute or Actual Occupation
Each of the four Supreme Court decisions discussed in this article are ultimately
about power over Indian resources, who has it and how much of it. As discussed below,
Mitchell I and Navajo Nation were decided against the Indian claimants in lesser or
greater part because of the Court's reading of the pertinent statute as giving the Indians
themselves, rather than the government, primary control of the resources. 30 0  By
contrast, in Mitchell H and White Mountain Apache, the government's pervasive control
of Indian assets directly led to the finding of an actionable fiduciary duty.
Twenty years ago, in Mitchell II, the Supreme Court ruled that the governing
statutes imposed an actionable fiduciary duty to manage timber resources for the Indians
because the government, by statute, had "assume[d] such elaborate control over forests
and property belonging to Indians.,' 30 1 In Mitchell II, the government's assumption of
control over the resources was pursuant to comprehensive congressional directions
regarding how timber resources were to be managed, the lands were to be used, revenue
to be produced, and profits to be paid.
30 2
Coming forward in time to the present, in White Mountain Apache, the Court again
found that the government's assumption of control carried with it fiduciary
responsibilities for the assets it held. When Congress placed the Fort Apache property in
trust with the government for the tribe, the United States was granted authority to make
use of portions of that property. 30 3 As Justice Souter, for the majority, described the
government's subsequent action and its legal significance, the government then "availed
itself of its option," 30 4 the government "not merely exercised daily supervision but has
enjoyed daily occupation ' 3° 5 of the property, and the government accordingly "has
obtained control at least as plenary as its authority over the timber in Mitchell 11.
" 306
298. Id. at 475-76.
299. See supra pt. V.B. 1.a.
300. See infra pt. V.B.3.
301. 463 U.S. at 225.
302. See id. at219-24.
303. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 475.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
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To be sure, White Mountain Apache is an extension of Mitchell II's control
principle. In comparison with Mitchell II, the government's managerial control of the
Indian asset in White Mountain Apache was not mandated and was not regulated in detail
by a comprehensive statutory design. Instead, in White Mountain Apache, the
government exercised discretion to make use of certain property held in trust for the
tribe. Indeed, Justice Thomas, in dissent, protested that "the majority gives far too much
weight to the Government's factual 'control' over the Fort Apache property." 30 7 Instead,
the dissent contended, a Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act claim for damages must be
founded "in the actual text of the relevant statutes"30 8 and not be based merely on
"notions of factual control." 30 9
For theoretical and practical reasons, the White Mountain Apache majority has the
better of the arguments. First, the dissent makes too much of a purported dichotomy
between factual control and statutory managerial prescriptions, suggesting that the
majority departed from Tucker Act precedent that mandates finding a substantive right in
the text of a pertinent statute and that does not permit implication of a right to recovery
based upon circumstances or conduct between the parties. However, the government's
conduct with respect to the Fort Apache property cannot be divorced from the 1960 Act
which imposed a trust obligation on the government; indeed, the same statute
establishing a trust in favor of the tribe was the source of the governmental power to take
possession of the property. Although the Act did not require the government to assume
control, it permitted such control. When the government then chose to take physical
possession of the tribal assets, it did so pursuant to express statutory sanction. Thus, the
Tucker Act claim for breach of trust in White Mountain Apache truly was founded upon
a statute that conferred upon the government the necessary power to take control, from
which the fiduciary relationship emerged.
By contrast, if the government were to act ultra vires without congressional
authority and seize control of Indian property, that case would be on a very different
footing than the tribal claim in White Mountain Apache. In such a case of unauthorized
governmental usurpation, the government's conduct would be that of a trespasser or a
property taker, which would be redressable in court either through a claim under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for trespass 31 or under the Tucker Act for a taking under the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. 3 11 Plainly, such was not the case in White
Mountain Apache nor presumably in most cases in which the government exercises
factual control over Indian property.
Second, recognition of factual control of property as inherently including a
fiduciary duty to protect those assets is not a novel improvisation in White Mountain
Apache, but rather had been anticipated by the Court twenty years earlier. Quoting
307. Id. at 484-85 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
308. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 485 (Thomas, J., Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
309. Id.
310. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680.
311. U.S. Const. amend. V. For a discussion of taking claims against the United States under the Tucker
Act, see generally Sisk, supra note 26, at 576-79.
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favorably from a lower court decision, the Mitchell I Court summarized the control
principle in this manner:
[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or supervision over tribal monies
or properties, the fiduciary relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even though nothing is said expressly
in the authorizing or underlying statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund,
or a trust or fiduciary connection.
3 12
Based upon this language, scholars predicted that pervasive factual control would be
accepted as a sufficient basis upon which to rest a breach of trust claim, even absent a
statute that prescribes a detailed management role for the government.
3 13
Third, White Mountain Apache brings legal doctrine into conformity with
pragmatic reality, by giving full effect to the factual control assumed by the government
over Indian assets, that is, requiring the government to take the bitter with the sweet.
The presence or absence of a meaningful trust relationship turns upon whether one of the
parties has a substantial degree of control over the other. In the ordinary case, if a
federal statute fails to direct the government to undertake comprehensive managerial
duties for an Indian asset, the natural assumption will be that the Indian tribe or
individual Indians retain the autonomous power to make independent decisions regarding
that asset. By contrast, when the government takes direct and physical possession of
property, the tribe then loses that control. No less than when a statutory scheme
establishes comprehensive managerial control, the government's exclusive occupation of
Indian property necessarily forces the tribe to rely upon the government for proper
maintenance of that resource. From such dependence, especially when it is forced,
fiduciary obligations naturally flow.
Fourth, as discussed above, while the existence of an actionable fiduciary
relationship must have a statutory genesis, the common law of trust remains an
appropriate source of law to provide a standard by which to measure the government's
fulfillment of its duties. 3 14 When the government exercises pervasive actual control, the
need for a detailed statutory demarcation of each element of govenmental responsibility
fades, as the government's plenary control triggers familiar fiduciary obligations
developed over centuries in the common law of trust. As the Court held in White
Mountain Apache, notwithstanding the absence of specific statutory prescription of
duties to manage and conserve the property, the fact that the government occupied
property expressly subject to trust "supports a fair inference that an obligation to
preserve the property improvements was incumbent on the United States as trustee." 3 15
312. Mitchell I, 463 U.S. at 225 (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 624 F.2d 981, 987 (Ct. Cl. 1980))
(internal quotations omitted).
313. Newton, supra n. 19, at 805 (arguing that, for purposes of breach of trust claims, "[i]f the statutory
scheme is not comprehensive, pervasive actual control will probably suffice, with the caveat that control must
rest with the Government and not the individual [Indian]"); Wood, supra n. 228, at 1519 (observing that the
Mitchell H Court "suggested that, even apart from statutory expression of a trust, a fiduciary relationship arises
whenever the executive branch maintains extensive control over Indian property").
314. Seesuprapt. V.B.1.
315. 537 U.S. at 475.
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3. The Counter-Factor of a Statutory Purpose to Encourage Indian Self-
Determination
If pervasive and plenary control is the sine qua non of a fiduciary relationship per
White Mountain Apache, then the surrender of governmental oversight per Navajo
Nation is its antithesis. If the United States renounces its historical domination over the
Indian peoples by yielding management, supervision, and possession of Native American
resources, and thereby restoring autonomous and independent control to the tribe or
individual property owners, the governmental fiduciary role fades accordingly. In
Navajo Nation, the Court found that the government had not been assigned an extensive
managerial role in the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, thus leaving the primary power to
negotiate and transact coal mining leases to the tribes. 316 With the statutory design so
understood, there was no room for significant governmental intervention with attendant
fiduciary responsibilities.
The converse of the control principle exemplified by Mitchell II and White
Mountain Apache is the self-determination factor relied upon by the Supreme Court in
denying implication of a fiduciary duty in Navajo Nation. If the Court divines that the
underlying congressional purpose is to foster Indian self-determination, then it will be
inclined to regard inference of a fiduciary responsibility as "out of line" with the
statutory design.317 As Justice Ginsburg, for the majority, explained in Navajo Nation, if
Congress "aims to enhance tribal self-determination ' 3 18 by conferring primary authority
over resources to the tribe, reserving only a "more limited 'approval role, 3 19 to the
government, then judicial insistence that the government must intervene to second-guess
tribal decisions would undermine the congressional intent.320 After Navajo Nation, the
self-determination factor, when identified as fundamental to the statutory scheme, may
create a modest presumption that any residual governmental role is limited.
However, before declaring that self-determination is the cornerstone of a particular
statutory framework, a court must carefully consider whether the governmental role in a
particular case is best described as one of engaged management of mineral resources or
one of detached supervision of largely independent Indian management of their own
resources. In exploring the answer to that question of characterization, the court should
(1) act with a strong measure of judicial humility and (2) always be informed by the
distinctive statutory and regulatory rules pertinent to the singular factual context of the
case. Even when legislation returns some jurisdiction over resources to the tribe, the
government nonetheless must be held responsible for conscientious execution of those
obligations that endure in the statutory text despite the transfer of a degree of authority.
First, given the uneven course of dealings between the United States and the Indian
peoples over the centuries, marked as it is by episodic and dramatic fluctuations in basic
policy, any court ought to hesitate before assuming that Congress has wholly withdrawn
governmental accountability and utterly abandoned fiduciary commitments. In this
316. 537 U.S. at 507-08.
317. Id. at 508.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 509.
320. Id. at 508-10.
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regard, the Mitchell couplet offers a sobering object lesson about the danger of judging
precipitously before the entire statutory and circumstantial context has been fully
presented and sensitively appreciated. As with the other factors that emerged as
important in the 2003 duet of cases, the self-determination factor also appeared in the
earlier Mitchell sequence, although the initial encounter turned out to be a misleading
diversion from the critical path.
In Mitchell I, the Supreme Court read the General Allotment Act of 1887 as
placing the managerial responsibility upon the individual Indian and thus imposing no
fiduciary obligation upon the federal government:
[Two sections of the statute] indicate that the Indian allottee, and not a representative of the
United States, is responsible for using the land for agricultural or grazing purposes.
Furthermore, the legislative history of the Act plainly indicates that the trust Congress
placed on allotted lands is of limited scope. Congress intended that, even during the period
in which title to allotted land would remain in the United States, the allottee would occupy
the land as a homestead for his personal use in agriculture or grazing. Under this scheme,
then, the allottee, and not the United States, was to manage the land.
32 1
But, as subsequently revealed when the case returned to the Supreme Court as Mitchell
II, with the benefit of a fuller record of the sad and failed legacy of allotment as a
policy32 2 and with a complete inventory of the governing statutory framework, the
earlier impression that the governmental fiduciary role had been surrendered and that
Indians had assumed effective control of resources proved to have been far wide of the
mark. In Mitchell 1H, the Court acknowledged that, for the plaintiff Indians on the
Quinault reservation, the allotments were too heavily timbered for use in agriculture or
grazing, and, without saying so directly, the Court also appeared to understand that the
parcels were too small to be productively managed for timber harvesting without
collective governmental administration of the forest lands. 32 3  Moreover, upon
examining the extensive series of timber management statutes enacted in the many
decades following the General Allotment Act of 1887, the Court recognized that the
original allotment scheme had been superseded and that the government had assumed
detailed and comprehensive responsibilities that amounted to pervasive control of the
Indian timber resources.
324
Perhaps the Mitchell I Court should not be blamed for having accepted the case for
review under the shaky statutory premise that unwisely had been adopted by the lower
court. Nonetheless, in the Court's first public performance, it consequently presented a
fallacious and misguided rendition of the ballad of the Quinault people. To be sure, the
Mitchell I Court itself apparently recognized the tentative and incomplete nature of its
321. 445 U.S. at 542-43 (citations and footnote omitted).
322. See generally Royster, supra n. 28. Professor Royster described the allotment policy as one which
failed to "transform the Indians into yeoman farmers, but.., did wreak destruction within tribal communities."
Id. at 6.
323. 463 U.S. at 208-09; see Nell Jessup Newton, Enforcing the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship after
Mitchell, 31 Cath. U. L. Rev. 635, 654 (1982) (describing the factual context for the timber mismanagement
claims in Mitchell I).
324. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 219-23; see Newton, supra n. 323, at 654-55 (outlining the series of statutes
concerning management of timber resources on the allotments beginning in 1910).
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disposition, given the Court's express encouragement to the claimants to look for an
alternative statutory foundation for the timber mismanagement claims on remand.
325
Fortunately, the acknowledged possibility of the need for a course correction was
concretely realized in Mitchell II.
In the recent Navajo Nation decision, the Court likewise cabined the reach of the
decision, explaining in the first paragraph of its decision that it applied only to coal
mining leases negotiated and agreed to by the tribes under the Indian Mineral Leasing
326Act of 1938. In potential contrast, Justice Ginsburg noted early in the opinion that
this statute envisions a different and potentially more comprehensive role for the
Secretary of the Interior in approving and regulating leases for oil and gas on tribal lands,
including criteria to be applied in administrative approval of royalty rates. 327 For this
reason, the Court later in the opinion carefully limited its ruling by stating that
"[w]hether the Secretary has fiduciary or other obligations, enforceable in an action for
money damages, with respect to oil and gas leases is not before us." 328 The potential
significance of this express reservation should be highlighted. Given that the Court
necessarily understood that, with respect to gas and oil resources, the tribes possess
original authority to negotiate and transact leases, the Court presumably contemplated
that fiduciary duties for the government may coexist with some sizeable measure of
Indian self-autonomy.32 9  Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the new 1996
regulations implementing the Indian Mineral Leasing Act require the government to
consider the best interests of the tribe, although the Court understandably held these
regulations inapplicable to a lease adopted in 1964 and amended in 1987.330 For that
reason, a different fiduciary relationship analysis may apply even to coal mining lease
cases arising in the future, under the new regulatory framework, because the Tucker Act
applies not only to claims in which the substantive right is derived directly from a statute
but also to those founded upon regulations.
33 1
In other words, self-determination and governmental fiduciary obligations are not
always mutually exclusive. As Judge Baskir said when the case was before the Court of
Federal Claims, even though he determined-as did the Supreme Court subsequently-
that no breach of trust claim was stated in that particular case, such statutes implicate a
325. See 445 U.S. at 546 & n. 7.
326. 537 U.S. at 493 ("This case concerns the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA), 52 Stat. 347, 25
U.S.C. § 396a et seq., and the role it assigns to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) with respect to coal
leases executed by an Indian Tribe and a private lessee.").
327. Id. at 494-95.
328. Id. at 507 n. 11.
329. Significantly, the Navajo Nation majority did not overrule (or for that matter even mention) an
established line of precedent, cited in the dissent, in which governmental approval power, at least in certain
circumstances, "was understood to be a significant component of the Government's general trust
responsibility," even when the tribes were given greater responsibility for their own interests. See id. at 516
(Souter, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) (citing Tiger v. W. Inv. Co., 221 U.S. 286 (1911) and Anicker v.
Gunsburg, 246 U.S. 110 (1918)).
330. Id. at 508 n. 12 (citing 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1985)).
331. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (authorizing claim "founded either upon ... any Act of Congress or any regulation of
an executive department").
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"delicate balance .. between exercising fiduciary responsibilities and respecting tribal
sovereignty and self-determination.
3 32
Second, even when substantial power over mineral resources is restored to semi-
autonomous tribal entities, meaningful content must be given to whatever administrative
duties continued to be reposed by Congress in the executive departments of government.
Justice Souter, in dissent in Navajo Nation, acknowledged that one of the statutory
purposes was "to provide for greater tribal responsibility," 333 but argued that the statute
also imposed a meaningful approval obligation upon the government for the protection
of the Indians.334 In his view, the Court majority gave "overriding weight to the interest
of tribal autonomy," 3 35 thus erroneously draining any substantive content from the
Secretary's approval obligation and consequently "losing sight of the mixture of
congressional objectives. ' 33 6 Even if one agrees that the Court majority reached the
right balance under the particular statute at issue in Navajo Nation, the dissent rightly
admonished that discovery within a statute of a congressional purpose to enhance Indian
autonomy should not effectively immunize the government from being held to account
for its continuing fiduciary responsibilities. Accordingly, even when a court hearing a
breach of trust claim detects a congressional purpose to encourage tribal self-
determination as an element of the pertinent statutory framework, the court is not free to
disregard the specific terms of the statute that balance tribal autonomy with a
governmental supervisory role.
Still, after Navajo Nation, if statutory promotion of self-determination is not
intended to supersede governmental fiduciary obligations, then the statute should be
drafted so as to provide explicit guidance to the courts as to the extent of governmental
responsibility and the standards that apply to evaluate the proper exercise of those
duties.337 By providing specific prescription of duties and precise statutory definition of
standards, a fiduciary relationship, even of limited scope and circumscribed content, is
most assured of survival in the era of self-determination.
For example, as Professor Judith Royster has explained, the standard mining leases
under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (IMLA) addressed by the Court in Navajo
Nation are seldom used today.338 Instead, tribes tend to pursue mineral development
agreements under the terms of the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMIDA), 3 39
which the Supreme Court observed did not govern the coal mining lease at issue in
332. Navajo Nation, 46 Fed. Cl. at 231.
333. 537 U.S. at 517 (Souter, Stevens & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
334. ld at 517-18.
335. Id. at 518.
336. Id.
337. Cf id. at 510 (majority) (rejecting the argument that the Secretary's approval power should have been
exercised in the tribe's best interests because there were no "substantive prescriptions" in the provision; that is,
"no guides or standards circumscribing the Secretary's affirmation of coal mining leases negotiated between a
Tribe and a private lessee").
338. Judith V. Royster, Equivocal Obligations: The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of
Interest in the Development of Mineral Resources, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 327, 336 (1995).
339. Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (1982) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108).
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Navajo Nation.34 0  In contrast with the IMLA of 1938, the IMDA of 1982 expressly
requires the Secretary to determine whether the lease is "in the best interests of the
Indian tribe" 34 1 when approving or disapproving transactions with private companies to
develop mineral resources on tribal lands. 34 2 Thus, while Congress plainly intended "to
accord tribes greater control over the development of their mineral resources" 343-given
that leases are negotiated by the tribes and may not be entered without tribal consent-
Congress at the same time has preserved a central role for the Secretary and specified the
basis upon which that governmental power is to be exercised.344 Even with the manifest
congressional purpose of granting a considerable measure of independence to the tribe,
the supervisory directive to the Secretary must be given, full effect as well. Such
specifically-defined statutory duties establish a fiduciary responsibility, even if limited in
scope and even if its evaluation requires balancing the self-determination purpose.
Indeed, Congress expressly admonished that the Indian Mineral Development Act of
1982 was not intended to "absolve the United States from any responsibility to Indians,
including those which derive from the trust relationship."
345
In sum, while a congressional design to enhance tribal autonomy must be given
appropriate weight and certainly moves the center of gravity for implication of fiduciary
obligations, courts must remain alert for distinct statutory indications that Congress
recognized a continued need for meaningful governmental protection.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE MERGER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
CAUSE-OF-ACTION ANALYSIS IN INDIAN BREACH OF TRUST CASES
Given that each Indian breach of trust case will turn upon the individual facts of
the case and peculiar facets of particular statutes, asking the entire orchestra of federal
340. 537 U.S. at 509. That the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 was inapplicable to the particular
coal mining lease at issue in Navajo Nation was clear, given that the lease had originated in 1964 long before
enactment of the IMDA in 1982 and that the lease had been transacted under the legal regime of the IMLA of
1938. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the IMDA as inapposite in Navajo Nation, stated: "The IMDA
governs the Secretary's approval of agreements for the development of certain Indian mineral resources
through exploration and like activities. It does not establish standards governing the Secretary's approval of
mining leases negotiated by a Tribe and a third party." Id. For the casual opinion reader unfamiliar with
Native American mineral development and mining matters, this judicial dictum could lead to an unfortunate
misunderstanding. By this statement, the Court was merely reiterating that a standardized and simple lease
negotiated between a tribe and a private enterprise outside of the statutory parameters of the IMDA is beyond
the fiduciary scope of the IMDA. The Court should not be understood as indicating that any agreement that is
in the nature of a lease (that is, which creates a leasehold for the benefit of the mining company) and that was
negotiated between a tribe and a third party necessarily and invariably falls "outside the IMDA's domain." See
id. In fact, the IMDA authorizes "[a]ny Indian tribe, subject to the approval of the Secretary... [to] enter into
any joint venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement," for mineral
resources owned by the tribe. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (emphasis added). Thus, any suggestion that a "minerals
agreement" under the IMDA arises only with respect to mineral exploration and not to extraction or that the
IMDA authorizes only joint ventures between a tribe and a third party and not a lease arrangement would
contravene the plain text of the statute. In any event, because the meaning and scope of the IMDA was not
before the Court in Navajo Nation, the statement is dictum and should not affect future litigation regarding the
fiduciary obligations that apply to minerals agreements, even if framed as leases, that are transacted under the
IMDA regulatory scheme.
341. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b).
342. Id.; see generally Royster, supra n. 338, at 334-38.
343. Royster, supra n. 338, at 337.
344. Id.
345. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e).
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judges to play the very same note at each performance is an unrealistic expectation.
Disagreement in individual cases will persist. But, while we may not be able to achieve
perfect harmony, all courts now should be reading from the same general score. And one
melodic theme clearly should arise from the cacophony of sound-the musical blending
together in Indian breach of trust cases of the subjects of sovereign immunity and cause-
of-action.
As Judge Baskir of the Court of Federal Claims apprehended when the Navajo
Nation case was before his court, the questions of jurisdiction and statement of a claim,
although "conceptually different," 34 6 do "tend to merge"3 47 in the context of Indian trust
cases. Because jurisdiction and sovereign immunity now have been recognized and
confirmed as opposite sides of the same coin under the Tucker Act, this perceptive
recognition of the conceptual merger applies as well to the question of governmental
consent to suit in Native American breach of trust cases seeking the recovery of money
damages.
If an Indian individual or tribal claimant is unable to establish a meaningful
fiduciary relationship grounded in statute, then the lawsuit will fail, not for want of
jurisdiction or withholding of consent by the government to suit, but because no
cognizable cause-of-action has been stated that is redressable in money. But if such a
claimant is able to demonstrate that the government by statute or by exercise of power
has assumed fiduciary obligations, then the doors of the courthouse should be open to
compensate by damages for the monetary value of the harm caused by breach of those
duties.
346. 46 Fed. CI. at 227.
347. Id.
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